GUJARAT NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
GANDHINAGAR
Course: **Introduction to Sociology**
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End Semester Online Examination: July-August 2021

Date: 31st July, 2021
Duration: 8 hours **Max. Marks: 50**

Instructions:

- The respective marks for each question are indicated in-line.
- Indicate correct question numbers in front of the answer.
- No questions or clarification can be sought during the exam period, answer as it is, giving reason, if any.
- Word Limit: 10 Marks: 600-750 Words.

		Marks
Q.1	What's your understanding of Mead's statement "Self and Society are twin-born"?	(10)
Q.2	How do you identify the problems of maintaining objectivity and value neutrality in Social Science research?	(10)
Q.3	Critically review the article written by Pravin J. Patel titled, "Declining Social Control and the Rising Deviant Behaviour in India".	(10)
Q.4	What do you mean by social movement? How do you analyse the article written by Indranil De and Sanjib Pohit to explain the farmer's social movement in India?	(10)
Q.5	Discuss the various factors responsible for the origin and development of Sociology? What is your understanding of the article written by Johan Goudsblom and Johan Heilbron with reference to the history of Sociology?	(10)

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Article

Declining Social Control and the Rising Deviant Behaviour in India

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Abstract

Crime rates are increasing across the Indian society. Normally, such crimes are attributed to two broad categories of factors: (a) psychological factors like individual or mob fury and (b) administrative factors like the failure of law and order machinery. These explanations, however, do not account for the *increasing rates* of such demeaning instances. This article, attempting to explain the *increasing* crime rates, focuses on the social control theory. The main argument of the article is that the rapidly declining informal social control causes the phenomenal rise of decadent behaviour in the contemporary Indian society. Due to modernising forces, traditional social institutions and structures such as family, kinship, caste system and village community have become weak. As a result, the traditional informal social control based on shame has gradually diminished. And the sense of guilt, the functional alternative to shame, as an informal mechanism of social control, has not yet been fully institutionalised. This seems to be the major factor giving rise to widespread deviant behaviour in India. Although formal mechanisms of social control like police and judiciary do exist, they cannot be very effective without being reinforced with the informal social control.

Keywords

Crime, social control, culture, socialisation, shame, guilt

Horrendous offences are increasing in contemporary India. Alarmingly, these degrading incidents are not confined only to the youth, and nor are they contained in the private sphere of individuals. The alarming increase in instances of mob lynching reveals that the morally repugnant behaviour has also engulfed the public domains of the Indian society. The fact is further corroborated by rampant

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Table 1. Incidence and Rate of Cognisable Offences Committed Under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Special and Local Laws (SLL) During 2014, 2015 and 2016

	Crime Incidence			Crime Rate		
Crime Head	2014	2015	2016	2014	2015	2016
IPC	2,851,563	2,949,400	2,975,711	229.2	234.2	233.6
SLL	1,720,100	1,761,276	1,855,804	138.3	139.9	145.7
Total	4,571,663	4,710,676	4,831,515	367.5	374.1	379.3

Source: Government of India (2017, p. xvii).
Note: Number of crimes per 100,000 people.

corruption, which has enveloped almost all sections of the Indian society such as politics, government bureaucracy, police, judiciary, medicine, health care, armed forces, banks, businesses, industries, education and science and technology. Unsurprisingly, the Berlin-based 'Transparency International' reported in its *Corruption Perceptions Index 2017*, that India is one of the most corrupt countries, ranking 81 among a group of 180 countries surveyed. The report also indicates that the rate of corruption in India has significantly increased as compared to that of 2012.[1] Besides, as shown in Table 1, rates of cognisable crimes have also increased over a period. In the year 2016, a total 48,31,515 cognisable offences committed under the Indian Penal Code and Special and Local Laws were recorded, showing an increase of about 6 per cent over the year 2014. And the crime rate increased from 367.5 in 2014 to 379.3 in 2017.[2]

According to the above-referred source, crimes against women have also increased by 2.9 per cent in 2016 over 2015. A majority of the crimes against women reported in 2016 were under 'Cruelty by Husband or His Relatives' (32.6%), followed by 'Assault on Women with Intent to Outrage her Modesty' (25.0%), 'Kidnapping & Abduction of Women' (19.0%) and 'Rape' (11.5%) (Government of India, 2016, p. xix).

Theories Explaining the Deviance

Normally, such crimes are attributed by the media either to psychological factors such as individual abnormality, fury, passion or crowd behaviour or to the administrative factors like the failure of the law and order machinery of the society. But such explanations are trivial. To give a more comprehensive explanation of the *mounting degree* of deviance in India, deeper societal and moral factors need to be explored, since such crimes are indicative of the decaying moral fabric of the Indian society.

Evidently, other societies, including modern Western ones, are also not free from grievous crimes including mass killings related to ethnic cleansing or holocaust (de Swaan, 2015). However, some of the explanations of those phenomena also appear to be less than satisfactory. For instance, one such account, known as the situational explanation, formulated by Milgram (1974) and Arendt (1963–2006), attributes such crimes to the immediate situation that causes normal people to commit evil acts, meaning thereby: 'Under identical circumstance anyone

might commit similar crime'. Alternatively, the Dutch sociologist, de Swaan, proposed a socio-psychological explanation (2015). According to de Swaan, the social and psychological compartmentalisation of the predator and victim, caused by indoctrination and brainwashing propaganda, is responsible for the monstrous acts of genocide committed by the Nazis. Apparently, such explanations have an element of truth, but are inadequate from the moral and sociological standpoints.

Interestingly, sociologists have formulated several fascinating theories of crime and deviance. For instance, the 19th-century French sociologist, Emile Durkheim, one of the founders of modern sociology, was the first to formulate a sociological theory of the deviant behaviour. Explaining the variance in suicide rates in different groups, he argued that it was a societal rather than an abnormal individual phenomenon. Examining social compositions of different groups having differential suicide rates, Durkheim found that unusually high or low suicide rates were inversely related to social cohesiveness: the greater the social solidarity, the lesser the suicide rates, and conversely, the lesser the social cohesiveness, the greater the suicide rates (1897–2006). Inspired by Durkheim, Merton, the renowned American (sociolo)gist, developed the structural–functional theory of anomie (1968). Identifying four types of deviant behaviour, namely innovation, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion, Merton argued that they were the dysfunctional consequences of: (a) the overemphasis on the *goal of success* along with the underemphasis on *culturally prescribed legitimate means* to achieve it, and (b) the structural inequality of opportunities in the American society (1968, pp. 198–258). On the other hand, Lemert (1951) and Becker (1963) of the symbolic interaction school have proposed the labelling theory, attributing the cause of deviance to the process of labelling the deviants as 'deviants', who, in turn, owning that label, behave accordingly. In contrast, some sociologists proposing the conflict theory of crime argued that the deviance is caused by social inequalities and associated power dynamics (Liazos, 1972).

In this article, taking a cue from the social control theory proposed by Durheim and Merton, but departing from their arguments, I contend that *declining informal social control* is responsible for the rising decadent behaviour in the contemporary Indian society.

Morality and Informal Social Control: The Role of Shame and Guilt

It is now widely accepted by evolutionary biologists (Alexander, 1987), evolutionary psychologists (Campbell, 1975) and sociobiologists (Wilson, 1980) that, although human beings share many characteristics with higher animals, as explained by Darwin and Dawkins (Dawkins, 1967), humans are not merely animals. The distinguishing feature of the human society is culture, resulting from human actions and also determining them. Culture specifies certain norms, values, customs, institutions, practices and *mores* to be followed by human beings, making them moral animals, despite their self-serving animal instincts. Central to the morality is the ability of humans to anticipate the consequences of their actions (Ayala, 2010, p. 9018). This morality, encoded in culture, becomes the social glue bonding the members of the society, taming their basic instincts and enabling

them to learn how to live in harmony with others. Hence, the concept of ethical behaviour, based on the moral idea of 'good', as opposed to 'bad', is universal in the human society, though specificities of such conceptions may vary spatially and temporally. Every society develops the moral code of conduct defining a 'good' life. Members of the society internalise these cultural norms through the socialisation process, a process transmitting culture from one generation to another, mostly within the family and the educational institutions. These internalised norms, conjoined with informal sanctions like feelings of guilt and shame, maintain social order.

There are also formal mechanisms of social control. Formal control, codified in laws and enforced by the state-supported structures like police and judiciary, is more important in modern complex societies, whereas, the informal social control has been relatively prominent in simple societies. However, informal social control is not completely absent in complex societies. In fact, the formally codified laws and regulations complement the informal norms in the society, for no society can formally monitor every action of each citizen. Even if a society attempts to do so, the law enforcement personnel deficient in morality would be sorrowfully ineffective. Hence, the importance of informal control, based on societal morality and implemented by the feelings of guilt or shame, cannot be underestimated in any society.[3]

Varying Importance of Shame and Guilt in the East and the West[4]

Moral emotions of shame and guilt become the motive force to be 'good' and to avoid being 'bad' (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Morality thus negotiates the inherent social conflicts between the 'self' (ego) and 'others' (alter), resulting from egocentric or 'animalistic' instincts. Since emotions of shame and guilt are self-conscious emotions occurring in the situation of moral lapses, causing negative self-evaluation, they are often used synonymously. However, emphasising the difference between the two, Piers and Singer (1971) indicate that each of the two emotions produces different patterns of behaviour.

According to some scholars, the concept of guilt, traditionally rooted in the Christian belief of sin, is deeply internalised by the Westerners (Delumeau, 1990; Fredriksen, 2012). Not surprisingly, it has been the subject of interest among the Western scholars of various disciplines like psychology and anthropology. Freud, seeking roots of guilt in an individual's subconscious, argues that guilt, or self-reproach, has two sources: (a) fear of authority and (b) fear of the superego. Guilt arises from doing or intending to do something 'bad'; whether the action or intention is bad in absolute moral terms is irrelevant (Freud, 1930–2004). For instance, hatred for parents creates a feeling of guilt in an individual not because it is morally bad but because it causes the fear of loss of parental love.

On the other hand, the American anthropologist Ruth Benedict asserts that guilt as well as shame are embedded in culture. Writing during the Second World War, she made a distinction between shame culture and guilt culture to explain the

difference between the actions of the Japanese and American soldiers (Benedict, 1946). According to her, the concepts of 'right' and 'wrong', or 'proper' and 'improper' behaviour, are culture-specific; they differ from society to society. She claimed that the USA was a guilt culture while Japan was a shame culture. By highlighting this distinction, Benedict (1946) initiated a debate regarding shame culture versus guilt culture. Later, several scholars confirmed the distinction between the two cultures. For instance, after examining ancient Greek epics and plays, the renowned Irish classic scholar E. R. Dodds noted that shame was the guiding principle of honour and good life among the early Greeks, governing the Homeric man who was more concerned about public opinion than the fear of God. Later on, the moral emotions shifted towards guilt in Greece, beginning with the classical period (Dodds, 1951–2004).

Distinguishing the psychological and anthropological concepts of guilt, Gananath Obeyesekere, the US-based anthropologist of Sri Lankan origin, argues that psychological or, what he calls, primary guilt (P guilt) is different from the social or, what he considers, secondary guilt (S guilt). For instance, ambivalence towards one's parents produces a feeling of psychological guilt, whereas, a feeling of guilt experienced while violating traffic norms is an example of social guilt; the latter promotes conformity to societal norms (Obeyesekere, 1981, pp. 78–80).

However, some scholars argue that guilt and shame are not dichotomous concepts; there is a considerable overlap of feelings denoted by the two. Although Western societies rely greatly on guilt, the concept of shame is not completely absent there (Lal, 1998–2001, pp. 153–171). In the West, for instance, a person hitting a car against a tree while driving being sick will feel guilty. Nonetheless, the same person will feel ashamed if s/he attributes the accident to his/her incompetence (Wong & Tsai, 2007, p. 210). Moreover, the phenomenon called 'trial by media' in the West is also a mechanism to shame the persons publicly. Similarly, in the shame cultures of the East, it cannot be said that people are devoid of conscience or of guilt feelings. A person in the East will feel guilty for betraying one's own family members or friends, for causing social injury to them. For instance, Obeyesekere found that in Sri Lanka, the feeling of betrayal of a person by a relative surfacing at the time of the relative's death causes tormenting guilt, resulting in suffering and self-inflicted punishment (1981, pp. 77–78). But the individuals in the East will feel ashamed for not coming up to the expectations of his/her group members. Moreover, the amount and intensity of the feelings of shame and guilt vary from person to person even within the same culture. Some people are naturally more oriented to one kind of emotion than the other. Nevertheless, in reality, societies inevitably tend to emphasise one over the other. Deepak Lal, for instance, after reviewing the literature on the subject and surveying the history of Eastern and the Western civilisations, concludes that Western societies are characterised by two significant traits: individualism and the importance of guilt as a social control mechanism, whereas, Eastern civilisations are configured around two opposite poles, namely collectivism and shame (1998–2001, pp. 5–95). Hence, a consensus is emerging among scholars that there is a difference between the guilt culture and the shame culture (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007).

Distinguishing Characteristics of the Guilt Culture and the Shame Culture

Scholars have identified several distinguishing characteristics of the guilt culture and the shame culture (Crieghton, 1990; Fessler, 2004). Some of the major differences are depicted below.

1. To begin with, in a guilt culture, the actors think individually regarding the propriety of their behaviour, without regard to the reaction of others, whereas, members of the shame culture, also often denoted as 'shame–honour' culture, are bothered about what 'others' think about their actions. In the guilt culture, individuals feel guilty when they think that they have done something which they should not have done, or they did not do what they should have done, even if the 'others' have not noticed. Such persons have developed an ego-ideal based on the norms taught by their parents, teachers and society. On the contrary, in the shame culture, individuals feel ashamed viewing themselves from the standpoint of 'others'. They think it shameful if they have been noticed in 'improper' situations by the 'wrong' people. However, they will not feel ashamed doing the same thing if they think that no one has noticed their aberration. For instance, as Madan observes, in India, to show intimacy with one's spouse in privacy is acceptable, but in the presence of other relatives, it is considered shameful (1989, p. 119). In other words, guilt implies self-consciousness, whereas, shame entails other consciousness.
2. Additionally, in the shame culture, the foundation of social norms is in the group identity and associated ideas of shame, honour, duty, glory, loyalty and reputation. In India, for example, it is regarded as the duty (dharma) of the parents to arrange their daughter(s)'s marriage; their failure in doing so is looked down upon in most communities. Many terms frequently used in India connote the feelings associated with shame and honour: *sharm*, *sharam*, *laj* and *lajja* (all the terms meaning shame), *izzat* or *abru* (honour), *nak* (i.e., nose, as a symbol of prestige, e.g., *nak katana* [dishonour], *nak bachana* [to save the honour]), *shir* (i.e., head, as a symbol of honour, e.g., *shir neechaa karana* [to lose respect], the *shir unchaa karana* [to gain respect]), or *munh* (i.e., face, symbolising the social standing, e.g., *munh kala karan* [to lose honour]), *nam* (i.e., name, signifying reputation, e.g., *nam bigadana* or *badnam karana* [to lose fame], *nam banana* or *nam roshan karana* [to gain fame]) and so forth. Such terms are culturally irrelevant in the guilt culture of the West.
3. Besides, in the guilt culture of the West, moral norms and values governing the behaviour of individuals are assumed to be universal, being equally applicable to all members of the society, without regard to their social status. Whereas, in the shame culture, emphasising the ascribed status (the status inherited by birth), such rules are particularistic and situation specific. What is shameful for a person of one group may not be shameful for a member of another group. For instance, in India, to partake of

leftover food is shameful for upper-caste members, whereas, it is considered normal among some of the lower castes. Or, what is shameful in one situation may not be considered so in another situation. In many Indian communities, crying for adult males in private or in the family may not be considered as dishonourable or shameful as doing the same in public or in the presence of 'others'.

4. Moreover, the shame/honour culture, which considers success as honourable and failure as disgraceful, creates a social pressure on its members to win by any means, right or wrong, and to avoid failure at any cost. In such a situation, members, after failing, usually try to explain away their failure, using any alibi, justifiable or not. Since the conformity to group norms is considered an important goal and not the means used to achieve the goal, members of the shame culture are often tempted to use what the Westerners may consider 'morally unfair' means. The usual tendency to seek social approval or to avoid ridicule or derision from one's peers in such a society is more pronounced than the tendency to be morally upright. Not surprisingly, many middle-class Indian parents, who are almost neurotically concerned about the success of their children in scholastic performance, do not mind allowing their wards to adopt unethical practices, for the middle-class parents generally worry about the negative reactions of the 'significant others' (their neighbours, relatives, friends, etc.) regarding their children's failure. They consider failure as more humiliating and shameful than the use of wrong means to succeed. Unwittingly, it gives rise to a general feeling among the members of such a society that they are almost free to do whatever they feel like doing, provided they can get away with it. And, if caught, they would try to 'save their face' by disowning their deviance, or twisting either the facts or interpretation of facts or using the psychological defence mechanisms such as rationalisation, scapegoat and so forth. In the West, however, such cover-up would not only be unwarranted but also insufferable.
5. Also, members of a guilt culture consider their lapses as human and, therefore, pardonable. The importance of this fact is indicated by the prevalence of the age-old institution of 'Confession', particularly in the Catholic Church. Thus, guilt is more like self-inflicted punishment caused by moral transgression, and shame is akin to self-defacement due to an individual's failure in attaining a socially defined ego image and jeopardising the reputation of the 'membership group', which is also his/her 'reference group'.[5]

Notably, Freud's focus on guilt, disregarding shame, in his theories (Morrison, 1989, p. 5), reflects the relatively greater importance of guilt in Western culture. Similarly, Obeyesekere has pointed out that in the Sinhala language of Sri Lanka, like many other Eastern languages, appropriate terms expressing the emotion of guilt are conspicuously absent despite the fact that there are a number of words signifying shame and related ideas such as honour, status, prestige, loss of self-esteem and ridicule (1981, p. 79). This fact indicates that in Eastern societies, the concept of guilt is less important.

Societal Roots of Shame and Guilt Cultures

The roots of shame and guilt cultures can be traced to: (a) the differential emphasis on individualism in Eastern and Western societies and (b) the distinctive socialising processes in each culture.

Varying Emphasis on Individualism in the East and the West

Western individualism values personal freedom and achievement. In the West, personal accomplishments and achieved status are appreciated and rewarded. The individualistic West underscores competition, motivating people to 'stand out' as unique individuals. In contrast, the collectivist East appreciates belongingness of individuals to their group and conformity to group norms. In the East, 'self-effacement', 'bashfulness', 'humility' and 'modesty' are valued, instead of being 'unique'. In India, a Hindu's notion of the self (*karta*) is characterised by his/her location in the social hierarchy, particularly by caste status, defining the duties and obligations (dharma) of a person. A Hindu *karta* is a duty-bound moral agent (Khare, 1999; Madan, 1989, pp. 76–78). In such a society, conformity to group norms is approved, and dissent and difference are frowned upon.

The highly individualistic Western societies, following the Judaeo-Christian religious traditions, emphasise the responsibility of individuals for their actions. The need to conquer the evil tendencies of individuals and emphasis on owning moral responsibility for their own actions, both rooted in the biblical concept of sin, and deeply imbibed in their conscience, cause unbearable pangs of guilt for their moral lapses, even if their faults are unknown to others. Besides, the Western education system also reinforces individualism by nurturing independent thinking. In contrast, collectivist Eastern societies, lacking the biblical concept of sin, depend on traditional communities to enforce social norms by shaming the deviants. Besides, the education system of Eastern societies fosters memorisation rather than the application of one's own mind. Hence, even the educated people of Eastern societies are often incapable of applying their thought processes for morally guiding their social actions, leave aside a very large mass of uneducated and illiterate population greatly dominated by the authoritarian and conservative communities.

Since Eastern societies emphasise the cohesive group relations, approval or disapproval of the community, instead of the individual's conscience, directs a person's behaviour. As noted by Ronald, the American psychiatrist, '...The child is expected to be obedient and respectful of elders, to contain aggressive reactions, and to conform to traditionally well-defined responsibilities in Indian extended family...' (1988, p. 264). The Westerners compete to win the 'race', to get ahead of others. Therefore, the 'losers' or the 'laggards' are looked down upon. Eastern societies, on the other hand, though do not undermine competition, generally encourage their members not to fall behind the others in their group, instead of outsmarting them. The emphasis on shame in the East is, therefore, consistent with the high value of collective orientation, as against the individual's autonomy and independence cherished in the West. In the Eastern culture, a person's

inadequacies, considered shameful and causing humiliation to the group, may result in his/her expulsion from the group, driving other individuals to conform to group norms. Thus, the difference in cultural emphasis on shame and guilt in the East and the West, respectively, is related to the varying importance given to individualism in the two cultures.

Distinct Socialisation Processes in the East and the West

Socialisation is the process whereby individuals acquire the culture of their society. Since each culture tends to develop a modicum of value consensus, despite internal diversities, the self versus collective orientations are embedded differently in socialising processes with distinct types of sanction, and varying emphasis on shame and guilt in Eastern and Western cultures. While Western societies give primacy to autonomy and self-reliance of the individual, the goal of socialisation in the West is also to make a person independent from childhood. Unsurprisingly, in the USA, paediatricians advise parents of newly born babies to allow them to sleep alone, preferably in a separate room. On the contrary, in Japan and India, children are normally encouraged to sleep with their parents or siblings, in the same bed, often sharing the same blanket, almost up to adolescence. This practice is not due to a shortage of space. It is the result of the cultural norm in India and Japan to promote dependence on parents among children, as sleeping together is believed to promote group affinity (Crieghton, 1990, pp. 298–301).

Moreover, it is normal for parents in India to actively participate in the most personal decisions of their children, such as the choice of subjects to study, occupations to prefer and spouses to be selected (Ronald, 1988, p. 330). Arranged marriage, as against the norm of romantic love in the West, is still a preferred institution of the Indian parents and children. Correspondingly, in India, the separation of grown-up children from their parents, even after marriage, is often a painful phenomenon for the entire family. Similarly, discord in the family forcing grown-up sons to leave their natal families, or married couples to divorce or parents to live in old age homes has been mostly considered as a shameful phenomenon in the Indian society. As a corollary, social isolation, or rejection, or expulsion from the group, like expelling a person from the caste, is generally considered the most severe punishment. In the West, on the other hand, children are not only expected to be independent but are also separated from the parental family mostly by the age of 18. The absence of such separation is usually considered abnormal in the Western culture. And the Western individuals do not bother much about what others think regarding them. Therefore, expulsion from the group is not considered as a serious punishment by them.

Moreover, socialisation of Indian girls and boys in a middle-class family differs from the West. An Indian mother would generally socialise a girl child by eroding her individuality, anticipating her adjustment in the family in which she would be married. Since divorce or separation from her husband is considered disgraceful and maladjustment with her in-laws is viewed with anxiety, the anticipatory socialisation of a girl begins with the onset of puberty or adolescence.[6] From childhood, an Indian girl is made conscious of her gender and her future

role as a married person (Das, 2007, p. 69; Madan, 1989, p. 109). The gender distinctions among Indian boys and girls are so strongly ingrained in their persona during their childhood socialisation that to admonish a boy saying 'Don't behave like a girl' or to scold a girl saying 'Don't behave like a tomboy' is considered a shameful reprimand.

The difference in cultural emphasis on self versus collective orientation is also reflected in the social sanctions preferred by Western and Eastern parents while socialising their children. In a Western society like the USA, the most common punishment for moral lapses of their children is 'time outs', that is, confining them to their room, so that they can introspect on their wrongdoings and presumably develop the feeling of guilt. On the other hand, in Eastern societies like Japan and India, shaming is the predominant means to discipline the children (Ronald, 1988, pp. 264–265). Eastern parents, particularly mothers, punish their children for their misbehaviour by refusing to interact with them, declining to talk to them and even avoiding eye contact, pretending that the 'unruly' children do not belong to them anymore. This kind of banishment may continue for a while as a punishment to shame the children, ignoring their efforts to reconcile or their desperate cries of protests (Crieghton, 1990, pp. 298–299). Likewise, in Indian schools, the most common punishments given by teachers, like asking students to stand up on a bench in front of their classmates, publicly deriding them by calling them *gadha* (donkey) or *bevakoof* (idiot) etc., are aimed at insulting, ridiculing, humiliating and ultimately shaming them.

The variation in the socialisation processes of the two cultures, however, has the same goal: to inculcate 'appropriate' behaviour among children, in conformity with the preferred values of each culture which are, of course, diverse: 'self-orientation' in the West and 'collective orientation' in the East (Crieghton, 1990, pp. 298–301). Thus, there is consonance between the cultural value of the concept of the self and the socialisation process, accompanied by different types of sanctions, in both, the West and the East.

The varying emphasis on guilt or shame as the social control mechanism in the West and the East, respectively, is due to the general tendency of each culture to develop a degree of value consensus for harmonious social relations. In the West, the values of individualism and autonomy, the socialisation processes accompanied by appropriate punishment and the development of guilt as an internalised sanction are mutually compatible. Likewise, the values of the collective orientation and the dependence on the group, the processes of socialisation supported by befitting punishments and the development of shame as a moral sanction are in consonance in Eastern cultures (Crieghton, 1990).

Modernisation and Erosion of Social Control

No society is static. A variety of endogenous and exogenous factors change any society over a period, causing social problems, as witnessed both in contemporary Eastern societies like India as well as in Western societies of Europe and North America. As noted above, in the Homeric Greek, shame was the guiding principle

in the social life, and later on, guilt developed in classical Greece. And still later, modern individualism emerged in the West since the Renaissance of the 15th century and the Reformation of the 16th century. Following the Enlightenment, which originated in the mid-17th century, reason and instrumental rationality acquired centre stage, eclipsing faith. Modern science obliterated the need for God to explain the natural world, provoking Nietzsche to proclaim that 'God is dead', implying that the Christian God is no longer a credible source of absolute moral principles and that there is no objective and universal moral law. As a result, individuals were encouraged to be egocentric, thinking more for them, and also to challenge any authority based on tradition, religion or convention, including the Christian morality based on the concept of sin, weakening the grip of guilt over the Western individuals and causing a widespread moral crisis and ethical slackness in the West (Lal, 1998–2001, pp. 153–178). Although this view is too pessimistic, it has an element of truth. Extending his argument further, paradoxically, Lal makes an opposite argument about Eastern societies. Admitting that Eastern societies have borrowed the modern institutions of political democracy and the market economy from the West, he believes that the kind of moral crisis which engulfs the West will not affect them, because, he thinks, their social bonds will not be undermined as they do not depend on the Christian religious beliefs of sin but are cemented by the socialisation processes based on shame (Lal, 1998–2001, pp. 153–178).

A cursory look at the evidence from India, however, exposes the inaccuracy of Lal's assertion about Eastern societies. Undoubtedly, it is true that the Indian society, before the British rule, was a simple society characterised by agricultural economy and primordial institutions such as the joint family, kinship, caste and village community. It is also true that the norms for socially approved behaviour were enforced mostly by the mechanism of shame. Nevertheless, historically, the Indian society was neither homogenous nor static. The modernising processes (Eisenstadt, 1966; Lerner, 1958; Levy, 1966), of industrialisation, migration, urbanisation etc., initiated in India during the British rule and accelerated after independence, have most significantly changed the Indian society.

To be sure, it has been observed long ago that the modernising processes do not completely displace the traditions (Gusfield, 1967). The empirical evidence from the Indian society also corroborates the point (Madan, 1987, 1989; Rudolf & Rudolf, 1967; Shah, 2014; Singer, 1959; Singh, 1973, 1978; Srinivas, 1962; Sundarrajan, 2012). The recent studies on the Indian middle classes also reject the idea of essential commonality among the Indian middle classes, stressing the difference between the pre-liberalisation and post-liberalisation middle classes, and also emphasising internal differentiations within the post-liberalisation middle classes in terms of class and gender. Amid consumerism, promoted by media hype and new sources of household income, the influence of traditional institutions of caste, family, kinship and community has diminished. Yet, as Roy (2016, p. 289) points out, inter-caste lovers are mercilessly punished by the caste panchayats. Civil or court marriages, based on the concept of affective individualism, are still socially disapproved, as indicated by the numerous criminal cases filed by the relatives of girls accusing their male partners of kidnapping, abduction and even

rape. Thus, the emerging Indian middle class, full of complexities and contradictions (Donner, 2002, 2016; Fernandes, 2016; Patel, 2014; Roy, 2016; Srivastava, 2007), revealing the amalgamation of tradition and modernity, also reflects what Eisenstadt calls 'multiple modernities' (Eisenstadt, 2000).

Undoubtedly, the most perceptible and enveloping change taking place in India, due to modernisation, is growing individualisation, creating occasions of tensions within the families (Ronald, 1988, p. 332). The evidence shows that the modern values of individualism, freedom, liberty, privacy, equality, achievement, competition, mobility, etc., enshrined in the constitution of independent India, are actively promoted by the related processes of industrial capitalism, urbanisation, secularism, cosmopolitanism, consumerism, etc. As a result, the traditional institutions such as the joint family, kinship, caste and village community have become weak, giving rise to a mass society privileging individualism, self-orientation, anonymity, competition and privacy, particularly in the contemporary urban India. This newly emerging culture is also gradually spreading to rural India, with the increasing modernisation.

The tensions among conservative Indian parents, trying to retain their control over their teenage children, interested in exercising their choices in different spheres of life, like purchasing material goods or choosing life partners, are increasing. This process has been given a tremendous impetus by the ongoing digital revolution fostered by mobile phones, the Internet and social media. Consequently, parental control and collective authority are further weakened across contemporary India, which in turn has resulted in gradual erosion of the informal social control backed by shame. Of course, Western societies are also experiencing a moral crisis due to the declining religiosity and simultaneous decay of the concept of guilt in modern times. Notwithstanding that, in the West, the rule of law and the formal social control institutions, like police and judiciary, are still relatively more effective thanks to the deeply ingrained professionalism. Besides, in Western societies, the notions of citizenship and civic sense are relatively stronger in comparison to the developing countries of the East (Almond & Verba, 1963/1989, pp. 1–44). On the contrary, the concept of the rule of law in India is not yet fully institutionalised and socially legitimised. The police force and judiciary are plagued not only by the shortage of staff but also by the lack of professionalism, to a large extent. Such a system deficient in morality, backed by inadequate informal control, is miserably ineffective. Besides, as the cleanliness drive initiated by the Government of India indicates, the concepts of citizenship and civic sense are yet to evolve to a critically significant level. Therefore, the role of informal social control mechanisms becomes more important in India.

Since the processes of change experienced by India are now almost irreversible, it would be unrealistic to wish that the traditional informal social control based on shame, institutionalised in the pre-British Indian society, can be restored. India will have to search for new ways and means to strengthen informal social control. Without reinforcing the informal social control, it will be difficult to arrest the moral erosion eating into the vitality of the Indian society, exemplified by the heartless adulteration of milk, milk products and food items; the honour killings with or without the sanction of the *khap* (caste) panchayats; the merciless

murders of unborn girls in the embryo form; countless gang rapes; endless communal riots; rampant money laundering and sex scandals of the religious leaders; repugnant money minting by politicians and the legislators merely for performing their legitimate duties; ruthless suppression of individual freedoms, dissent and difference in the name of moral policing; widespread mass copying and plagiarism found in many academic institutions; and many more such instances of this distressing phenomenon.

However, still there is a ray of hope. As Taylor (1989, 2007) has observed, even in modern Western societies, the concept of moral good has not totally disappeared, despite the fading influence of religion. The Western individuals do not completely lack in spirituality since the concept of the self is linked to morality, and morality implies what one considers to be good. Likewise, in India, though emerging individualism and instrumentalism are the new cultural alternatives available to the people, spirituality and the concept of good are not completely displaced. Nonetheless, with rising individualism and declining sense of shame, it is essential that the emotion of guilt needs to be strengthened along with the formal instruments created to maintain law and order, like police and judiciary. Since change is a slow process, it seems, in the meantime, India is likely to remain a society with weak informal social controls of both shame and guilt. With widespread socio-economic inequalities conjoined with fragile formal and informal mechanisms of social control, large-scale deviance is likely to prevail in contemporary India, at least for some time.

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Notes

1. *Corruption Perception Index 2017*, Transparency International, Berlin, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017
2. A crime rate describes the number of crimes reported to law enforcement agencies per 100,000 people.

3. Although some scholars consider fear also as a part of informal control, in this article, the focus is mainly on shame and guilt, because the emotions of shame and guilt are based on morality and therefore they differ from the feeling of fear significantly (Ekman & Davidson, 1994, p. 176).
4. The East and the West in the context of global geography, however, are nebulous terms, and are, therefore, differently used for different purposes. However, according to the widely shared perception, the Eastern world consists of Asia, including the Middle East, while Europe and North America depict the Western world. Nevertheless, neither the Eastern nor the Western civilisation is homogenous. For instance, historically, the distinction between the Jews and Christians has been a source of tension in the West for a long time. Likewise, the distinction between the Catholics and the Protestants, elaborated by Weber (1930–1950), among others, is too well known to be ignored. Moreover, history has recorded several wars caused by the national differences among several European countries. On the other hand, the East is even more diverse in terms of people, religion, culture, language, etc. The vast differences found in countries such as India, Japan, China and those of the Middle East illustrate the point. Moreover, Eastern societies are also not characterised by uniform and coherent culture. Thus, the essentialist view and way of the East are not sustainable. Notwithstanding the denial of the essentialist view or the traditional cultural coherence view (Rathje, 2009), it must be admitted that the distinction between the East and the West has a heuristic value, as amply reflected in academic discourse. Not surprisingly, a vast library of literature exists on the topic. Just to mention one contemporary example, Huntington's (1996/2003) classic study is based on the cultural differences between the East and the West. The distinction between the two civilisations is considered so important by the international community of scholars that even the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and The Research Center for Moral Science, Institute of Moralogy, Japan have been interested in the issue for a long time and, of late, had organised a symposium on 'Cultural Diversity and Transversal Values' (2006).

   Empirically also, the East and the West differ in their attitudinal orientations. Broadly speaking, greater emphasis is given to individualism or self-orientation in Western societies, and conversely, Eastern societies are demarcated by the overwhelming importance given to community life and collective orientation (Das, 1995; Madan, 1987, 1989; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1993).
5. For reference of group theory, see Merton (1967).
6. Merton has elaborated upon the concept of anticipatory socialisation while formulating his theory of reference group (1967).

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Rich farmers dominate farm protests in India. It's happening since Charan Singh days

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Rich farmers dominate farm protests in India. It's happening since Charan Singh days

The agriculture sector, like large and medium industries of the Indian economy, also needs a well-organised industry representation.

INDRANIL DE and SANJIB POHIT

30 September, 2020 9:32 am IST

Sri Muktsar Sahib: Leader of opposition AAP MLA Harpal Cheema, Rupinder Ruby and Baljinder Kaur, MLA's from Aam Aadmi Party join the protesting farmers against the proposed amendments in the marketing of farm produce at Badal village, in Shri Muktsar Sahib district, Thursday, Sept 17, 2020. (PTI Photo)(PTI17-09-2020_000279B)

The farmers' agitation against the Narendra Modi government's agriculture legislation is getting bigger with those protesting also receiving political backing. However, a look at the history of agricultural protests in independent India shows that the benefits of such struggles aren't always reaped by all sections of the farming community— protests have remained largely ineffective to usher in meaningful policy changes. Even the most popular uprisings of the 1980s led by Bharatiya Kisan Union have not been very effective as they furthered only the interest of large farmers, with no agenda for the small farmers and labourers.

The farmers' march from Nashik to Mumbai in March 2018 was triggered by large scale destruction of crops and improper implementation of loan waiver schemes. It was organised by All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS), backed by the Communist Party of India (Marxist). The Maharashtra government did promise to fulfil the demands, but they were never executed. In November 2019, All India Kisan Sangharsh Coordination Committee (AIKSCC), a coalition of about 200 farmers' organisations from across India, organised a movement against the inclusion of agriculture in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) free trade agreement. India ultimately opted out of the RCEP, but more due to the fear of dumping of industrial goods than for its concerns around protecting domestic agricultural producers.

Also read: *Punjab farmers will now protest against new farm laws at Reliance outlets, Adani silos*

The Charan Singh era

India has a long history of farm movements. Surplus generated out of the Green Revolution made farmers a politically significant group. Chaudhary Charan Singh was one of the first to identify its potential. He formed the Bharatiya Kranti Dal in 1967 and became the leader of Bharatiya Lok Dal in 1974 after merging the former into six other parties that were in opposition to the Indira Gandhi government. He promoted the interest of rich and middle peasants belonging to middle and backward castes. He fought for the abolition of landlordism, consolidation of landholding and resisted taxing agricultural surplus. The farmer leader had also initiated a food procurement scheme in Uttar Pradesh after becoming the chief minister in 1967. This led to significant upward bias in agricultural prices and profitability of agriculture in subsequent decades.

Chaudhary Charan Singh formed the Bharatiya Kisan Union (BKU) in 1978. After his death in 1987, Mahendra Singh Tikait resurrected the organisation in Uttar Pradesh. The BKU took a non-political position, which it continues till now to draw its legitimacy. In the 1980s, the BKU led movements protesting against high power tariffs and erratic supply. The organisation demanded remunerative prices, parity in power rates with other states, and lowering of input costs. The *dharna* organised by Tikait in Meerut in January 1988 attracted lakhs of peasants, including women. The Uttar Pradesh government relented to the pressure by providing concessions and including the BKU representatives in the Agricultural Prices Commission and local development bodies. Zoya Hasan in her 1989 paper in *Economic and Political Weekly* says that the benefits given by the government were more rhetorical than real.

The BKU's movements of the late 1980s, however, had limited success. That's because it was a movement to protect and promote the interests of surplus producers by maximising only their economic returns, and did not involve the entire farming community. The leadership belonged to the affluent peasant class— teachers, former Army men and retired government officials. The BKU's demands did not take into account the interests of poor peasants, agricultural labourers and artisans. The organisation had no concern for

the minimum wage rate. The poor peasant and agricultural labourers who participated in the movement did so due to their primordial loyalties. As a result, all groups of the farming community did not emerge as a united force.

Also read: *Farm reform laws open the market. Now, a regulator is needed*

Small share in the Atmanirbhar package

The farming community in India has failed to organise big movements and pressurise the government to fulfil its demands in recent times. The stimulus package, given by the Narendra Modi government to revive the economy from the shocks of Covid-19, has little to offer to the agricultural sector. The package that accounts for 10.05 per cent of India's GDP, includes fiscal and monetary measures. Only 7 per cent from this economic package has been dedicated to agricultural and allied sectors even when it is most important to invest in this segment of the economy because the migrant labourers who have returned from big cities would ultimately depend on traditional agriculture till the economy revives.

Among all the segments of the Indian economy, large and medium industries are probably the best organised with multiple chambers of commerce and industry associations and representations in each state. Most sectors are well placed to propagate their interests with help from sector-specific associations or federations to serve their interests. In spite of lower attention to agriculture and very minimal support given to the migrant labourers, there has not been any farmer or labour unrest raising these issues. This reveals the lack of capacity on part of the poor farmers to organise as a group and raise their demands.



Source: RBI, Government, Media, NSE

Also read: *Amarinder vows to fight 'malicious, anti-national' farm laws through agitation, legal action*

A protest of the few

The lack of the farming community's ability to emerge as a united force across the states and farming class is evident in the ongoing protests against the farm legislation as well.

According to the Shanta Kumar Committee report in 2015, only six per cent of the farmers could sell their produce to government agencies. Hence, the ongoing protests serve the interest of only a tiny portion of the farming community.

The protest is intense in states where the value of procurement is higher, and not necessarily in states that have more procurement centres. While more than 60 per cent of the procurement (in terms of value) of wheat takes place in Punjab and Haryana, only 13 per cent procurement centres are from these two states. Bihar, where the APMC Act was repealed in 2006, still accounts for 30 per cent procurement centres, with a miniscule 0.02 per cent procurement, making these centres economically unimportant for the farmers.

Similarly, 25 per cent procurement of paddy takes place in Punjab, where only 3 per cent procurement centres are operating. Furthermore, 44 per cent procurement centres are in West Bengal, from where a meagre 4 per cent sourcing takes place. This means that the procurement system benefits only a disproportionately lower percentage of farmers — those with very high value of produce. And many of the procurement centres in certain states are economically unimportant for the farmers. It is very natural that the ongoing protests cannot have an all India presence and cannot cover all sections of the farming community.

AVERAGE PROCUREMENT BY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (2017-20)

STATES	WHEAT		PADDY	
	Procurement Value (%)	Procurement Centre (%)	Procurement Value (%)	Procurement Centre (%)
Punjab	37.03	10.65	25.65	3.10
Haryana	25.35	2.56	9.22	0.40
Uttar Pradesh	12.60	34.98	7.46	5.92
Madhya Pradesh	20.61	18.38	3.19	1.76
Bihar	0.02	29.43	2.32	11.73
West Bengal			3.92	44.09

Source: Food Corporation of India

The inability of the farmers to sell their produce on time and get remunerative prices is a real problem. Although India has modernised in many areas, the interlocking of product, credit, labour and land markets in rural pockets continues to thrive. We need farm movements that demand facilitation of better linkages with markets that practice fair dealings.

The farm movements in India are plagued by overrepresentation of rich farmers as a political force. They provide the critical mass, without which the protests cannot snowball. However, agitations dominated by a few rich farmers may not solve the problem of the farming community as a whole. The interests of all groups have to be advanced. The richer farmers have to set an agenda for the benefit of the poorer and vulnerable members. The participation of the latter would benefit the former, as well as the whole farming community. The community needs to emerge as a unified force to bargain for and usher in meaningful policy and reforms.

Indranil De is Associate Professor, Institute of Rural Management Anand (IRMA), Anand. Sanjib Pohit is Professor, National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER), Delhi. Views are personal.

Akalis could look at BSP for alliance, and BJP at a new SAD, as curtains fall on old ties

SAD-BJP break-up could see a tectonic shift in Punjab's electoral ecosystem with Akalis expecting to gain enormously from the move and BJP set to lose ground.

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Sociology, History of

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Abstract

The development of sociology is rarely analyzed from a sociological point of view, using the insights, concepts, and methods of the discipline itself. The most common historical reconstructions are textbook histories, written for pedagogical purposes presenting the canonical figures in a more or less chronological order. In the absence of a standard sociological account, the development of the discipline may be conveniently regarded as a long-term process structured by five major stages: a long predisciplinary stage up to 1830, marked by what in retrospect may be recognized as proto-sociologies; the formation of an intellectual discipline, both as an idea and an ideal (1830–90); the formation of an academic discipline with diverging national traditions (1890–1930); the establishment of a fully fledged academic discipline (with autonomous degrees, departments, research facilities); and an emerging international hierarchy (1930–70); and a period of crisis and fragmentation, attempts at new synthesis, and globalization (1970–present).

The standard way in which surveys of the history of sociology are written and taught still lags behind actual developments in the field itself. The writing and teaching of the history of sociology continue to be strongly dominated by the tradition of the history of ideas. Only fairly recently have some major attempts been made to view the history of sociology from a sociological angle, using sociological concepts, methods, and theories.

In the absence of a standard *sociological* survey of the development of sociology, we shall in this outline mainly follow the familiar textbook trajectory. This approach inevitably implies distortions. It suggests a pattern of Whig history, in which the history of sociology is made into a neat succession of successes. To balance that bias, the reader should bear in mind that the development of sociology itself has been a social and cultural process, consisting of a multitude of short-term planned actions and interactions with aggregate results that in the long term have not been planned by any single individual. This process took place, moreover, as a part of wider social and cultural developments.

The context was primarily European and, since the second half of the nineteenth century, North American; yet, as Europe and North America belonged to a more encompassing global constellation, we should also consider other traditions of thought and the relevance of the processes of colonization and decolonization affecting nineteenth- and twentieth-century society and culture all over the world. Much of this work, however, for such a broader view of the discipline's development remains to be done.

Sociology, furthermore, was one of the social sciences amid other intellectual disciplines: academic disciplines ranging from physics and biology to history and philosophy, as well as non-academic disciplines including journalism, political debate, and literature. Sociology took on an articulate form in continuous dialogue with those other disciplines, sometimes borrowing ideas from them, sometimes opposing them. Most of the controversies within sociology itself reflected its relations to the larger field of intellectual activities. This would be true of the moral or political views informing sociological theories as well as of the preference for either quantitative, 'scientific' methods or a qualitative, 'hermeneutic' approach (Lepenies, 1988).

In addition to the differentiation into (1) theoretical and methodological orientations, sociology has also become differentiated according to (2) empirical specializations, and (3) national traditions. These various forms of differentiation are respectively related to (1) the prevailing orientation to other intellectual disciplines, including science, philosophy, literature, and journalism; (2) the general process of differentiation of functions in society at large; and (3) international relations. While the variety of empirical specializations and national traditions is easily visible, this is not so clearly the case with the way the national traditions are 'nested' in an evolving international constellation characterized by specific hierarchies, loyalties, and corresponding intellectual interests.

We shall not continuously refer to the more general conditions affecting sociology in the following account which, because of its encyclopedic format, is written in accordance with standard practice. The reader should realize, however, that these conditions are relevant to each of the five major stages into which the development of sociology can conveniently be divided:

1. A long 'predisciplinary' stage up to 1830, marked by what in retrospect may be recognized as 'proto-sociologies'.
2. The formation of an intellectual discipline, both as an idea and an ideal, 1830–90.
3. The formation of an actual academic discipline with diverging national traditions, 1890–1930.
4. The establishment as a fully fledged academic discipline with autonomous degrees, departments, and research facilities and an emerging international hierarchy, 1930–70.
5. A period of crisis and fragmentation, attempts at new synthesis, and globalization, 1970–present.

In discussing the successive stages, we shall have to observe a basic rule of 'phaseology' (Goudsblom et al., 1996: pp. 15–30): when a later phase begins, new elements are added to the previous constellation; but most of the elements which

were already present in the earlier phase will continue to exist, albeit in a modified and less conspicuous guise.

The Predisciplinary Stage

By a discipline we mean a "unit of teaching, research and professional organization" (Heilbron, 1995). There is a body of knowledge, recognized as such under a generally accepted name, laid down in textbooks and discussed in professional journals by practitioners.

All of these elements were absent from the field of sociology prior to the nineteenth century. Yet we can list many names of people who may, arguably, be regarded as predecessors, 'proto-sociologists': people who reflected about social phenomena, collected data about social life, or tried to find patterns in human history. Some individual contributors to these traditions have gained great renown in their own cultures. Thus, from ancient Greece, the names of such men as Herodotus, Plato, Thucydides, and Aristotle stand out. Although they have been 'appropriated' as founding fathers by the practitioners of the established academic disciplines of philosophy and history, many of the problems they addressed lay in the area of what was later to become sociology. Chinese, Indian, and Arab culture have similar intellectual traditions; here, too, a few individuals have become the famous exponents of those traditions (Collins, 1998).

In this brief survey, we shall be able to pursue only the Western line leading up to the emergence of sociology as an intellectual discipline in Western Europe and North America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Since the Middle Ages, there was, on the one hand, a strong tradition of philosophizing about human social life, mainly in theological and moral-legal terms, and, on the other hand, an increasingly strong tradition of collecting facts, most often related to state matters and focused on knowledge of the population and its resources, both at home and abroad (as reported by explorers and travellers). By and large, the two traditions stood apart.

The transition from the predisciplinary stage to the actual conception of sociology as an intellectual discipline in its own right occurred in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The shift consisted partly in conscious attempts to bridge the gap between theory and empirical inquiry, between philosophical reflection and the collection of facts about social life. The leading intellectual model, furthermore, was sought no longer in theology or metaphysics but in empirical science. Insofar as the focus had been either on the political realm or on more 'private' moral issues, it now moved to the structure and development of 'society' at large. This threefold shift in orientation was pioneered by the groups which have become known as the French *philosophes* and the Scottish moral philosophers. Their work was developed in different directions during the last decades of the eighteenth and the first decades of the nineteenth century.

Among the *philosophes*, Montesquieu was one of the first and most influential. He demonstrated that types of government are to be understood in relation to their moral and physical infrastructure. For an understanding of such connections, a recognition of the 'general spirit' of a nation is central. This 'spirit' or 'common character' results from the combined effect of various causes, including climate, religion, and commerce. Instead of drawing deductions from an original principle such as a political or social contract, Montesquieu thus started to unravel the complex interdependencies of human society.

While Montesquieu pioneered the study of what Auguste Comte later was to call 'social statics', his younger contemporary, the future statesman Turgot pointed to the possibility of also viewing human society from a developmental perspective, in other words, in terms of 'social dynamics'. That idea was further elaborated in theories of successive stages or phases by such writers as Condorcet and Henri de Saint-Simon.

In a kindred spirit, the Scottish moral philosopher David Hume proposed introducing "the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects". Hume and his younger friend Adam Smith rejected theories based on an assumed state of nature. Such reasoning had characterized the natural law tradition – the predominant framework for early modern theories of government and moral obligation (Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Pufendorf). For Hume, the state of nature was a hypothetical construct, incompatible with the precepts of empirical science. To consider states as the result of an original voluntary act of agreement was illusory and contrary to scientific procedure. Social institutions, in Adam Ferguson's famous phrase, "are the result of human actions, but not the execution of any human design". From this perspective, morality would have to be studied historically and comparatively, tracing its development through the successive stages of hunting, shepherding, agriculture, and commerce.

As the idea of a general social science gained ground, various attempts were made to connect that idea to existing scholarly disciplines. Some groups, particularly in France, pursued the ideal of a social science modeled after the natural sciences. Thus, by applying probability theory to voting procedures and judicial decision making, mathematicians such as Condorcet and Laplace proposed a 'social mathematics'.

British liberal thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham and James Mill somewhat similarly tried to build a social and political theory upon the idea of a moral arithmetic. Individuals and governments alike should promote the amount of happiness and reduce the amount of pain. Their felicific calculus, aimed at the greatest happiness of the greatest number, provided the means for assessing the utility of public institutions. Others, such as Saint-Simon, couched their analysis of early industrial society in a medical idiom advocating a 'social physiology'. Conservative social theorists such as Edmund Burke, Joseph de Maistre, and Louis de Bonald, by contrast, while recognizing the reality of 'social relations' and 'society', opposed the notion of a natural science of society, and rather sought inspiration in theology, philosophy, and history.

The Formation of an Intellectual Discipline (1830–90)

In the course of the nineteenth century, empirical social research became a regular and organized endeavor. Most of it was centered on the 'social question' and intimately linked with governmental agencies and reform movements. Besides a multitude of local initiatives, national associations arose for the coordination of these efforts: the French *Académie des sciences morales et politiques* (1832), the English *National*

Association for the Promotion of Social Science (1857), the *American Social Science Association* (1867), and the German *Verein für Socialpolitik* (1873). More theoretically informed work made use of the research findings, but was carried out mainly by individual scholars who either possessed private means or made a living by writing and lecturing. Thus, Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill, and Herbert Spencer were for most of their professional lives publicists, men of letters with a strong interest in the sciences. All three contributed significantly to the formation of sociology as an emerging discipline, but none of them was a regular academic or was actively involved in social research.

Other writers, such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Karl Marx, and Adolphe Quetelet, shared similar interests, but consciously avoided the term sociology. Marx and Tocqueville have been incorporated in the canon of the discipline only after 1945. While Tocqueville called for a 'new political science for a new world', Marx' critique of political economy resulted in a theory of capitalism and class domination. The Belgian astronomer and statistician Quetelet continued the efforts of Condorcet and Laplace. He considered the ever growing body of statistics to be the proper basis for a 'social physics'.

When Comte publicly introduced the term sociology (the word had previously been used in an unpublished manuscript of the French revolutionary publicist Sieyès), he was likewise concerned with the idea of a fundamental science of human society. At the time, Comte had no interest in applied knowledge, rejected premature specialization, and wanted to construct an appropriate foundation for social science. The term sociology captured all of these ambitions quite well. It conveyed the idea of a positive science, suggesting both a high level of generality and a great degree of independence from the natural sciences. For Comte, sociology was to become an uncompromising positive science but should not be conceived of in terms of either physics or physiology. Instead, sociology was to biology what biology was to physics: a relatively autonomous science with its own subject matter and mode of conceptualization.

In the *Cours de philosophie positive* (1830–42), Comte explained that different methods prevail in the various sciences: the experimental method in physics, the comparative method in biology, and the historical method in sociology. Sociology had to be founded on a historical law. Since human beings specifically have the capacity to learn, the development of knowledge is the core of human development, and Comte considered his law of the three stages in the development of knowledge as the proper point of departure for sociology.

Comte's plea for sociology as the general social science was well received in England, first in the circle of John Stuart Mill, then by Herbert Spencer. Mill rejected Comte's criticisms of psychology and political economy, but admired his philosophy of science and embraced the idea of sociology. Yet, like the French followers of Comte, Mill never wrote a properly sociological study. One of the first sociological treatises appeared in the 1870s and was written by Spencer – the most widely read sociologist of the nineteenth century.

For Spencer, progressive change was the common denominator of all natural processes. From the maturation of an embryo to the evolution of life in general, all living things evolve from the simple to the complex through successive differentiation and integration. Evolution is the natural process of change from incoherent homogeneity to coherent heterogeneity. Human societies are no exception: they too develop through differentiation, a process steadily accompanied by higher levels of integration and coordination.

Spencer's view of evolution was thus broader in scope than both Comte's sociological and Darwin's biological theory. Combining a laissez-faire view borrowed from economics with an embryological model of growth, Spencer gave the evolutionary principle the status of a universal law and made it the core of his all-embracing system of synthetic philosophy. As stated in his influential essay 'The Social Organism' (1860), Spencer's sociology was cast in the organic idiom, while carefully maintaining an individualist perspective. In *Principles of Sociology* (1876–97) he elaborated his analysis, emphasizing the passage from 'militant' to 'industrial society'. In the latter, social integration is no longer imposed from a controlling center, but the spontaneous result of individuals who cooperate on the basis of a division of labor. Spencer strongly favored a laissez-faire stance, opposing state politics (in matters of welfare as well as in colonial expansion), and inspired what was – inaccurately – called social Darwinism.

His position as a freelance writer and lecturer allowed Spencer to make virtually unlimited claims for the scope of sociology. While he was most outspoken and influential in articulating the idea of sociology as an intellectual superstructure sustained by an evolutionary perspective and overarching all the other social sciences, that idea was shared by several other leading advocates of sociology in Europe and the United States.

The Formation of an Academic Discipline, 1890–1930

Sociology as an academic discipline sociology emerged between 1890 and 1930. The first courses and chairs were established, sociological journals appeared as the primary outlet for research; and sociological associations were founded for furthering intellectual exchange and professional interest. France, England, Germany, and the United States were the core countries, and in all of them distinct national traditions took shape.

Wherever sociologists managed to obtain a position in the academic world, they had to accommodate to the constraints of established institutional divisions. The realm of law was the domain of the legal profession. The study of the past was already successfully claimed by the historians. In a similar vein, psychologists succeeded in monopolizing individual development and behavior as their field of expertise, economists specialized in the economy, anthropologists in the structure and culture of nonliterate societies. Sociologists had little choice but to accept this division of academic labor as a social fact; this left a strong mark on the way they conceived of their own discipline.

Emile Durkheim was the pivotal figure in French sociology. He taught his first course in 1887, wrote classic works on the division of labor, suicide, and the rules of sociological method in the 1890s, and organized a network of highly productive scholars around his journal, the *Année sociologique* (1898–1912). By proclaiming that social facts had to be

explained by other social facts, Durkheim broke away from the predominant biologistic and psychological approaches. His explanation for variations in the suicide rate was a paradigmatic example. The social realm was a reality *sui generis* with its own structure and regularities. Systems of collective representations are an essential part of social life, not merely when studying religion or morality, but also for understanding the economy and political institutions. Following this line of argument, Durkheim and his collaborators (Marcel Mauss, Henri Hubert, Marcel Granet, Maurice Halbwachs, François Simiand) worked on a wide range of topics, contributing to many fields outside of sociology proper.

In England, sociology did not gain a proper entry into the university system until well after the Second World War. The rich tradition of factual inquiry was continued by government officials and wealthy individuals (Charles Booth, B.S. Rowntree), but remained almost entirely separated from academia. Despite the existence of a sociological journal and a professional association, the British academic establishment did not show much interest in sociology. The only chair for a long time had been established in 1907 for L.T. Hobhouse, who, in 1929, was succeeded by his pupil Morris Ginsburg. Both men maintained a cautious evolutionary perspective but neither one built up a network of productive scholars. Whereas British academics showed little interest in studying their own society, they had no such inhibition about studying the exotic regions of the British Empire. Social anthropology became a respected academic discipline and partly served as a substitute for sociological concerns.

Sociology in Germany emerged later than in France and England; a professional association was founded in 1910, a first chair in 1917, and a journal in 1921. The academic pioneers in Germany, men like Ferdinand Tönnies, Georg Simmel, and Max Weber, faced two powerful indigenous traditions. The oldest was that of the *Staatswissenschaften*. The proponents of these disciplines (law, economics, public administration) consistently subsumed civil society to the various functions of the state. This mode of thinking had its roots in eighteenth-century cameralism and was refashioned in the nineteenth century by idealist philosophers such as Hegel. After the founding of the German Empire, the members of the *Verein für Socialpolitik* maintained much of this conception of social science. They were opposed by liberal economists like Carl Menger during the first *Methodenstreit* in the 1880s and 1890s and by Max Weber and others during the second *Methodenstreit* in the decade prior to the First World War. An important aim in Weber's argument about the value-freedom of scientific inquiry was to create a greater distance from the practice of the state sciences.

The other tradition with which German sociologists grappled was the persistent opposition of the natural versus the cultural sciences: the former were supposed to be concerned with causal explanation, the latter with interpretative or 'hermeneutic' understanding. Early sociologists such as Comte and Spencer had often been rejected in Germany as representatives of an inadequately naturalistic conception of the human sciences. Reflecting on these epistemological issues, Max Weber proposed to transcend the dichotomy by ingeniously defining sociology as the science of social action, which by interpretative *understanding* seeks to *explain* its course and consequences.

Weber was nominated for a chair in sociology shortly before his death in 1920. His achievements and those of others of his generation (Simmel, Alfred Vierkandt, Werner Sombart, Franz Oppenheimer) contributed to the recognition of sociology as an academic discipline during the Weimar Republic (1919–33). Sociology expanded rapidly, opening opportunities for a generation of young scholars including Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Theodor Geiger, Karl Mannheim, and Norbert Elias. Although all these men had initially received a training in different academic fields, they were ready for brilliant careers in sociology. However, the seizure of state power by the National Socialist Party in 1933 made an abrupt end to the favorable outlooks for German sociology, forcing all these scholars along with many of their colleagues into exile.

Sociology's most rapid expansion took place in the United States. The first courses were taught in the 1870s and 1880s, while the expansion of higher education in the 1890s furthered a quick institutionalization. Within two decades, sociology was taught in most colleges and universities; textbooks standardized the concepts and methods of the new discipline.

American sociology developed primarily on the basis of empirical research into current social problems. The main topics were the issues which were widely debated by politicians, religious leaders, and social reformers: massive immigration, urbanization, industrialization, local communities, social (des)integration, and ethnic and race relations. Empirical studies proliferated, based either on statistical material or on actual fieldwork.

By the 1920s, the sociology department in Chicago, founded by Albion Small in 1893, had become the predominant center. Small also played a key role in the *American Journal of Sociology* (1895) and, together with George E. Vincent, wrote the most widely used textbook, *An Introduction to the Study of Society* (1894). The work of the Chicago School was founded on qualitative case studies, using observations, interviews, and life histories. Exemplary were William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki's *The Polish Peasant* (1918) and the collective volume on *The City* (1925).

Parallel to the entry of sociology into various national academic systems, the French sociologist René Worms founded an international association, the *Institut international de sociologie* (1893), and an associated journal, the *Revue internationale de sociologie* (1893). Worms brought together a considerable number of the best known European and North American sociologists; the major exception being his French competitors around Emile Durkheim (Fleck, 2011). The membership of his International institute, which held 13 international congresses between 1893 and 1937, included many nonacademic dignitaries, as well as numerous scholars from other disciplines, such as law and economics, and the focus of the meetings was more on the discussion of general themes than on the advancement of research. The limited significance of this incipient internationalization is well illustrated by the fact that the two most important sociologists, Durkheim and Weber, never met one another nor did they ever refer to each other's writings.

Establishment as an Academic Discipline, 1930–70

Between 1930 and 1970, sociology became established as an academic field at most universities in the Western world. The number of practitioners and students greatly increased, and

there was a proliferation of specializations in research and teaching. Far from being an even process of growth all over, however, these trends were marked by far-reaching structural changes: a severe break down in the development of sociology in Europe and a concomitant shift of intellectual leadership in the field from Europe to the United States.

The leaders of the first generation of American academic sociologists all acknowledged an intellectual debt to European masters. Even in the early 1920s, it was still not uncommon for a promising American social scientist to start his career with a European apprenticeship, as did Talcott Parsons who went to London and Heidelberg. At the time, however, the westward exodus of sociologists from Eastern Europe was already underway, as the communist regime in Russia and the fascist regime in Hungary tightened their grip, greatly restricting the margins for sociological inquiry and reflection. The year 1933 brought the decisive rupture: the seizure of power by the Nazis in Germany put an end to the flourishing sociology of the Weimar Republic and forced a great number of prominent and promising sociologists into exile, mostly to the United States (Fleming and Bailyn, 1969).

In contrast to Europe, sociology in the United States suffered no drastic interruptions in the years between 1933 and 1945. It remained a subject in most college curricula, with textbooks such as Park and Burgess's *Introduction to the Science of Society* (1924) continuing to supply an authoritative framework of concepts and ideas. At the same time, practically oriented research in areas of social problems and social policy was stimulated by increasingly generous funding from both government and private foundations (Platt, 1996). Empirical research received a powerful boost after 1941, when social scientists were recruited for the war effort and commissioned to study variables fostering the morale of the Armed Forces.

After 1945, the United States emerged as the major political, economic, and cultural power in the world. In the social sciences, including sociology, American examples were virtually unrivalled in setting an international standard of competence in method and theory. An impoverished Europe lacked the resources for challenging the American ascendency. The relatively autonomous sociological traditions in Germany and Italy were virtually destroyed. Sociology in England had only a minor position at the London School of Economics. In France, the Durkheimian tradition continued to exert considerable intellectual influence among anthropologists and historians, but the institutional basis for sociology as an academic discipline had seriously weakened.

Thus the scene was set for American dominance. The sociology departments at Harvard and Columbia University in particular gained international renown. At Harvard, Talcott Parsons developed a new synthesis of sociological theory, mainly derived from European predecessors, which he presented as a 'general theory of action' – although in its worldwide reception it became known as 'structural functionalism' or simply 'functionalism.' Still, Parsons' generally recognized status as the world's leading sociological theorist did not imply that his ideas put a mark on the entire discipline. There were some influential rival theorists, including his Harvard colleague George Homans who advocated a strictly scientistic 'exchange theory' inspired by the model of *homo economicus*. At Columbia, Parsons' former student Robert Merton propagated a more modest ideal of 'theories of the middle range,' which proved to be very well compatible with the work of his colleague Paul Lazarsfeld, an immigrant from Austria who specialized in the organizational and methodological aspects of social research.

The years between 1955 and 1975 in particular spelled a boom period for American sociology (Turner and Turner, 1990). The successful launching of Sputnik by the Soviets in 1957 inaugurated an era of unprecedentedly high government funding of scientific research in the United States, which also benefited sociology. In the 1960s, a combination of demographic trends (the postwar baby boom) and political discontent made for a dramatic increase in student enrollments. Professional self-confidence, which had been clearly mounting since the early 1940s, surged to new heights. The auspices were favorable for manifold activities in the realm of academic sociology: systematic elaboration of theoretical ideas in the Parsonian fashion; exploration of the possibilities of rivaling theories presented under such labels as exchange theory or symbolic interactionism; and empirical research, conducted in many forms from intensive 'qualitative' case studies to extensive quantitative surveys, and applied to a broad range of social phenomena. Sociologists in most other capitalist-democratic countries outside the United States adopted similarly diverse programs for teaching and research.

The expansion of the discipline was accompanied by more regular forms of international circulation. American foundations like the Rockefeller and the Ford Foundation supported empirical social science research, both inside and outside the US, and provided grants for studying at American universities. UNESCO initiated and funded international social science associations, among them the International Sociological Association (1949), which was founded on the basis of a small number of national organizations from the core countries. The growth of the ISA was initially assured by the increasing membership of national associations (Platt, 1998). In spite of the Cold War but in line with the UNESCO policy to promote international understanding, national associations from several Communist countries in Eastern Europe joined in the late 1950s. In the course of the 1960s and 1970s, membership increased further by allowing individuals and associate members to join, thus breaking away from the United Nations model of national representation. Among the associate members were regional organizations from Europe, Latin America, and Asia. As the meetings of the International Sociological Association testified, by the end of the 1960s sociology was a blooming pluralistic discipline, with a tacitly accepted hierarchy of prestige headed by American sociologists whose ideas set the agenda for the discipline at large. Unintendedly, the publication of the 17-volume *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* in 1968 spelled the ending of that era.

Crisis and Fragmentation, Attempts at New Synthesis, and Globalization 1970–Present

If the years around 1970 formed a watershed in the development of sociology, the tendencies that then became manifest had been at work for some time. Mainstream academic

sociology as represented by the combination of functionalist theory and survey research rapidly lost its appeal to a new and vociferously critical generation. With much programmatic gusto, new 'paradigms' were launched, highly diverse in their implications, but all radiating the same radical spirit. Inspired by political protest movements, a culture of dissent arose in sociology, criticizing the intellectual canon and the professional stance of the discipline. The short-term result of this turmoil was the demise of functionalism as the leading theoretical perspective, and a flurry of controversies about a mixture of ideological, epistemological, and methodological issues. At a longer term, after a reaction to the surge of politicalization had taken place and the world economy was hit by a severe recession in the late 1970s, the manifest controversies receded and a state of fragmentation ensued to which most practitioners tacitly accommodated.

Fragmentation took many forms. The most obvious and least contested form was the proliferation of subdisciplines around an unsystematic array of specific research areas such as the sociology of the family, organizations, and culture. Then, equally noticeable but far more controversial, there was a plurality of theoretical orientations, often with corresponding methodological presumptions. Some theories were primarily attuned to specific forms of microsociology, marked by an affinity to various philosophic schools ranging from phenomenology (embraced by ethnomethodologists), through pragmatism (preferred by symbolic interactionists), to neo-positivism (for rational choice theorists). Network analysis emerged out of the study of microinteractions as well, but it developed into a set of techniques and ideas that could be applied at any level of aggregation. In the realm of macrosociology, functionalism as a perspective gave way to new approaches influenced by Marxism and emphasizing social conflict and long-term social transformations. Fragmentation was further enhanced by a weakening of the hierarchy in the international sociological community, growing geographical diversity, and an increased articulation of national traditions.

None of these changes came out of the blue; but together they produced an almost revolutionary shock to the world of sociology. Whereas the most famous sociologists of the previous generation had all been Americans, now European names again came to the fore: Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens, Jürgen Habermas, and somewhat later, Zygmunt Bauman, Ulrich Beck, and Manuel Castells. During the early 1970s, while many older sociologists deplored the patent end to the illusion of consensus in the discipline, there was also a widespread sense of excitement over new intellectual possibilities and career opportunities. Ideological debates around many current topics, from gender and race relations to the reform of psychiatry, were saturated with sociological references.

The later 1970s saw a dramatic reversal in this mood of confidence. General public interest turned away from sociology, student enrollments dropped rapidly, and research funds shrank – the only sediment of the earlier high tide that remained was internal fragmentation and pluralism. The general stagnation at first reinforced the tendencies toward fragmentation, as established subdisciplines tried to maintain their position in the face of diminishing institutional support for, and intellectual vigor of the sociological discipline as a whole. However, the 1980s and 1990s also brought new attempts toward a synthesis. Thus, in historical and comparative sociology the orthodox Marxist approach tended to be softened by combining it with a more liberal Weberian perspective. 'World systems' theory as originally developed by Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein helped to break away from the implicit focus on the national state that characterized most sociological work during the preceding stage. Making the transnational order, conceived either as a world system, or alternatively as 'transnational society,' into the centrepiece for sociological study gave counterweight to the tendencies toward national parochialism. After the collapse of communism and parallel to the rapid development of computer technology and the internet, globalization became a key area of debate and research. It soon proved a challenge to the organization of the discipline as well. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, sociology is practiced in virtually every country and region around the world, levels of transnational communication and collaboration are rapidly rising, and English has become the language of global social science. While much of the production of articles and books remains concentrated in North America and Europe, where the most prestigious journals and departments continue to be located (UNESCO, 2010), sociology's more global scope has also provoked a vivid debate about Western hegemony, indigenous traditions of thought, and the diversity of globalizing sociology (Patel, 2010).

Other ventures in historical and comparative sociology have sought synthesis in a different direction. During the 1980s and 1990s, Randall Collins valiantly subjected a wide range of long-term cultural trends (including religion and philosophy as well as technology) to sociological analysis, while Jack Goldstone and Charles Tilly brought sophisticated techniques of statistical analysis to bear on huge sets of historical data. Meanwhile Norbert Elias's work, aiming at a thorough integration of sociology with history and psychoanalysis, was gaining influence inside and beyond the discipline.

These promising signs could not hide the fact, however, that after decades of rapid growth in the 1960s and 1970s, sociology had entered a period of less favorable circumstances. The welfare state came under siege in many Western countries, and neo-liberal policies in favor of deregulating and extending markets gained the upper hand. Even if the collapse of the Soviet empire and the termination of the Cold War have not spelled 'the end of history', these events did lessen interest in ideological matters and theories of society.

At the universities, the established social science disciplines (economics, sociology, anthropology, political science) have faced increasing competition from new multidisciplinary fields of study, which are more immediately focused on policy needs (organizational studies, management, business) or the demands of particular student groups ('Black studies', gender studies). The strains of the present situation are also conducive to a revival of the old polarity between 'scientistic' and 'humanistic' approaches. Provocative challenges to the social sciences have come from sociobiology and the neurosciences, while the scientistic posture gave a great deal of prestige to 'rational choice' models by means of which assumptions and

methods derived from economics are applied to a wide array of non-economic relations. Resisting the invasion of economics, other sociologists advocated an opposite move, to resubmit economic processes and institutions to sociological scrutiny and redevelop economic sociology. Ironically, the humanistic approach is posing a similar risk: embracing culturalistic and postmodern ideas, drawn mainly from current anthropology, literary studies, and hermeneutic philosophy, may also detract sociologists from the core of their discipline – the study of social processes and social structures.

The opposing social currents at work in the world today, as well as the more directly felt institutional pressures and intellectual challenges are confronting sociology with a variety of contradictory claims. Recognizing the many sources of confusion is a first requisite in order to arrive at a balanced response to this situation. Equally important for a more reflexive sociological practice is a continuous reconsideration of the history of the discipline.

See also: Comte, Auguste (1798–1857); Discipline Formation in the Social Sciences; Durkheim, Emile (1858–1917); Marx, Karl (1818–83); Social Science and Universities; Sociological Traditions; Sociology: Overview; Specialization and Recombination of Specialties in the Social Sciences; Spencer, Herbert (1820–1903); Weber, Max (1864–1920).

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